Le demandeur conteste la résiliation avec effet immédiat d'un contrat de distribution exclusive conclu avec le défendeur et portant sur des produits alimentaires. Le défendeur avait motivé sa décision de résiliation en se référant à la modification intervenue dans la direction générale de la société demanderesse, modification qui, selon lui, rentrerait dans le cadre des cas de résiliation prévus par le contrat, ainsi qu'au défaut de ressources permettant au demandeur de lui payer les sommes dues dans le délai convenu. D'après le demandeur, ces motifs cacheraient la concurrence déloyale, la modification en question étant le licenciement du directeur général qui aurait créé une entreprise concurrente à celle du demandeur et avec laquelle le défendeur aurait établi des relations commerciales faisant concurrence à celles existant entre le demandeur et le défendeur. Pour déterminer le droit applicable, l'arbitre unique tient compte de la nature des relations contractuelles entre les parties. Il conclut à l'application de la Convention des Nations unies sur les contrats de vente internationale de marchandises (Convention de Vienne), tout en s'appuyant également sur les <b>Principes d'Unidroit</b> qui en font écho (en l'occurrence, la force des pratiques établies entre les parties (1.8) et l'atténuation du préjudice (7.4.8)). L'arbitre décide que la résiliation du contrat dans ces conditions était injustifiée et accorde au demandeur des dommages-intérêts pour le préjudice causé par la rupture du contrat et des relations commerciales existant depuis plusieurs années, ainsi que par les actes de concurrence déloyale commis à son égard, le tout majoré d'intérêts au taux légal applicable à la monnaie dans laquelle sont calculés les dommages. Il condamne le défendeur à supporter l'intégralité des frais de l'arbitrage, le demandeur ayant eu gain de cause sur la presque totalité de ses demandes.

<i>Sur le droit applicable :</i>

'Bearing in mind, firstly, that the contractual relationship between Respondent and Claimant ended in September 1995, and that the task of the arbitrator is limited to judging a dispute, the arbitrator feels there is no need to determine the applicable law as the parties could have done at the start of their relationship.

Bearing in mind, secondly, the provisions of Article 13.3 of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, which invite the arbitrator to determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, the sole arbitrator believes that the starting point for determining the applicable law should be the claims and counterclaims made in the dispute. . . .

Analysis of the grounds for this first claim for compensation shows that the part connected with the activity of exclusive distributor represents less than one tenth of the compensation relating to Claimant's loss of profits in trading the goods manufactured by it.

This means that the quality of contract of sale prevails over that of distribution contract, if the contractual relationship is taken as a whole. Claimant's other two claims are a consequence of the cancellation . . . or connected with the circumstances of the cancellation of the contractual relationship . . .

In the presence of a contractual relationship qualified overall as one of sale, the arbitrator must, in order to resolve the dispute, determine an appropriate law, as he is invited to do by Article 13.3 of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration. According to widespread case law in arbitration practice, one of the criteria for the appropriate nature of a rule is its presence in the legal systems of both parties. This is the case in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, signed in Vienna on 11 April 1980. This Convention came into force in Denmark on 1 March 1990 and in Spain on 1 August 1991, which date is after the signature of the contract but sufficiently remote for the text to have been studied and commented on in particular in Spain. . . .

Article 3.2 of said Vienna Convention calls for it to be applied in situations where, as in the present case, there is both a provision of a service and a sale, and the preponderant part of the obligations arise from the sale. The same Convention encourages the choice of a single law, desired by both parties, for dealing with disputes.

Furthermore, the provisions of the Convention and its general principles, now contained in the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, are perfectly suited to resolving the dispute. . . .

It should also be understood that the provisions of the contract signed in . . . shall apply as the law governing the parties.'

<i>Sur l'incapacité du demandeur de payer les sommes dues dans le délai fixé par le défendeur :</i>

'The succession of events highlights the fact that Respondent attempted to change the practices and habits followed by the parties from at least March 1993. The change concerns the time-limit for payment and the requirement of a constant balance between deliveries and their payment.

According to Article 9.1 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980, "the parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves". This rule was extended to all international commercial contracts by the Unidroit Principles. Principle 1.8 provides that: "The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves."

The arbitrator considers that such a rule is perfectly suited to resolving the dispute between Claimant and Respondent, even though the cancelled contract is a contract for exclusive distribution. Hence, in order for previous practices to be changed, the proposal made by one of the contracting parties needed to be accepted by the other party. . . .

The changes Respondent wished to make should have been negotiated and accepted. In the absence of agreement between the two parties, the arbitrator considers that the fact of maintaining the practices accepted previously - at least tacitly - by both parties does not constitute "gross negligence" on the part of Claimant.

The arbitrator does not consider the reason given for denouncing the contract, which refers to the lack of means of paying within the time-limit fixed by Respondent, to be properly founded.'

<i>Sur la demande d'indemnisation formulée par le demandeur en raison de l'interruption de son activité provoquée par l'impossibilité d'utiliser des produits d'autres fournisseurs :</i>

'. . . the arbitrator considers that the sudden, unexpected interruption of deliveries to Claimant caused harm to the company. Such harm took the form of difficulties in adapting to a new situation requiring changes in manufacturing arrangements. The arbitrator notes that Claimant neither provides proof that these difficulties lasted for a year nor indicates what efforts it made and what difficulties it encountered during the stage of adapting to different conditions and products.

Respondent points out pertinently that it is a principle of international commercial law that the party suffering harm must take the necessary steps to mitigate the harm. For contracts of sale, this rule is expressed in Article 77 of the Vienna Convention in the following terms: "A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated."

In general, a similar rule is set out in Article 7.4.8. of the Unidroit Principles, which states: "The non-performing party is not liable for harm suffered by the aggrieved party to the extent that the harm could have been reduced by the latter party's taking reasonable steps."

In the absence of indications as to the efforts and attempts made by Claimant during the alleged year of inactivity, the arbitrator considers that this commercial inactivity was caused in part by Claimant's inertia.'